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Abstract Counterfeiting of manufactured goods is presented as the theft of
intellectual property, patents, copyright etc. accompanied by identity theft.
The purpose of the identity theft is to facilitate the intellectual property theft.
Without it the intellectual property theft would be obvious and the products
would be confiscated and destroyed. Authentication solutions, to prevent iden-
tity theft, were then developed for the two categories of manufactured goods
i.e. goods which can be subjected to destructive screening strategies and goods
which cannot e.g. pharmaceutical drugs and currencies, respectively. The so-
lutions developed were found to be analogous to digital signatures. Tamper
proof packaging on pharmaceutical drugs is analogous to encryption because it
prevents Mallory from interfering with the product. Breaking the tamper proof
packaging is a one-way function. Concealed inside the packaging a one-time
password, which can be used to authenticate the product over the internet.
The name of the authentication website must be common knowledge, just like
a public key for authenticating digital signatures. Otherwise the counterfeiters
will specify their own authentication website. This solution can be altered for
currencies i.e. the one-way function, equivalent to opening the tamper proof
packaging, becomes the method of manufacture of the currency.
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2 Joseph Kilcullen
1 Introduction
In a world where technologies proliferate over time, eventually anything you
can manufacture, I can manufacture. If true, then over time, there is nothing
to stop anything, including paper money, from being counterfeited. As a first
thought experiment consider the following: A patented pharmaceutical drug,
where the published patent specification is sufficient for anyone to manufac-
ture the drug. Now imagine a generic drug manufacturer utilising the patent
specification to manufacture the drug.
Without licencing the patent this manufacturer cannot legally sell the drug.
However if they package the drug in identical packaging to the patent holder’s
product, then, without the rule of law intervening, they can sell their product.
The product is such that it actually contains 100% of the active ingredient.
In the same way that a counterfeit handbag is still a handbag, this product
is only counterfeit in so far as it is sold with a stolen identity, and stolen
intellectual property. The product itself is genuine. The counterfeit handbag is
manufactured with a stolen design, but, it too is also a genuine/real handbag.
Both of these examples are identity theft counterfeiting i.e. the counterfeit
product bypasses trademark law, patent law or copyright law. But the product
is not of inferior quality.
Anti-counterfeiting solutions that merely detect defective or substandard
products cannot protect against identity theft type counterfeiting. However,
identity theft solutions can protect against both substandard products and per-
fect copy counterfeiting. From this, it follows that we can prevent counterfeit-
ing by preventing manufacturer’s identity from being stolen i.e. by preventing
identity theft. Identity theft is easily prevented via cryptographic authentica-
tion.
This interpretation is supported by earlier work where I found phishing at-
tacks to be the counterfeiting of an identity not the counterfeiting of a website
[1].
In the tradition that is academic publication of theories and hypothesis
I leave this hypothesis to the academic community to consider. Assuming
that this hypothesis is correct I will now proceed to devise cryptographic au-
thentication solutions to protect pharmaceutical drugs and currencies, from
counterfeiting. These two products correspond to manufactured goods which
can be subjected to destructive testing and goods which cannot. In the con-
text of counterfeiting such strategies are usually referred to as tests, hence
’destructive testing’ is a destructive screening strategy.
2 Authenticating Pharmaceutical Drugs
Pharmaceutical drugs are packaged in tamper proof packaging which is dam-
aged or destroyed on opening. On receiving a product whose tamper proof
packaging has been opened a consumer will either bin the product or return
it to the shop. Effectively tamper proof packaging is a game theory signalling
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strategy. Open packaging does not mean the product has been tampered with,
however intact packaging does guarantee that the product has not been inter-
fered with. Consumers understand this so they will not trust the product from
opened packaging.
Fig. 1 Schematic of classic cryptography actors reinterpreted for counterfeiting of drugs.
Eve is shown though she does not play a role in counterfeiting. Tamper proof packaging
fulfils the role of encryption because it prevents Eve and Mallory from interfering.
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 are the typical scenario for cryptography. They are shown
here to aid our reinterpretation, of the interaction, as the counterfeiting of
pharmaceutical drugs. Box A corresponds to money being exchanged for the
pharmaceutical product, box B. Eve is shown though she does not play a role
in counterfeiting. Fig. 2, can represent a Phishing attack or the sale of a coun-
terfeit product. In each case Mallory simply ’packages’ the fake product in
packaging, identical to the original. For Phishing attacks this means creating
a website which looks like the original. For counterfeiting of pharmaceutical
drugs this means replicating the genuine product’s packaging. Tamper proof
packaging is analogous to encryption. It prevents Eve and Mallory from in-
terfering. Fig. 2 shows the counterfeiters, Mallory, taking on the role of Bob.
This is a consequence of inadequate authentication of Bob.
TLS in its current form prevents eavesdropping yet it fails to complete
Bob’s authentication [1]. In the same way tamper proof packaging merely
guarantees that the product has got to you safely from the factory. It does
not tell whether the package came from Bob or Mallory, from the genuine
manufacturer or a counterfeiter. This is analogous to a phishing attack carried
out over a TLS connection. We must complete Bob’s authentication to ensure
it’s not counterfeit.
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Fig. 2 Schematic of Phishing attack scenario, or counterfeit goods scenario. The coun-
terfeiters, Mallory, take on Bob’s role. Also they place the product inside tamper proof
packaging, ironically, so that Alice knows that nobody has interfered with the product.
2.1 Prior Art - Existing Systems & Solutions
I do not believe this solution can be patented because of a number of prior
art solutions and, at least one, similar patent. A part of this solution which
is not prior art (to my knowledge) is documented below in the section titled
’The Common Knowledge Website’. Here follow some examples of prior art:
– Various promotional offers exist where promotional codes (single use au-
thentication passwords) have been concealed inside a product’s tamper
proof packaging. Kellogg’s currently have a Free-Spoon offer where the
shared-secret is printed on the inside of the cereal box. Similarly Coca-
Cola has had offers where promotional codes (authentication passwords)
have been printed on the inside of bottle caps.
– Pre-paid mobile phone top-ups. The top-up code is a single use password.
Notionally it is concealed until the time of purchase when the shop assistant
prints it. (Consider this after studying the solution presented below.)
– References [2] and [3] are patent specifications for a very similar solution to
the solution outlined below. Their first claim contains an additional clause
which is not present in my solution.
A key component of this solution which is not prior art is the ’common
knowledge’ website, detailed below.
2.2 Pharmaceutical Drug Authentication
Here follows an outline of the solution. As stated this is quite similar to refer-
ences [2] and [3], though I arrived at this solution following the research into
phishing attacks [1].
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– Tamper proof packaging enclosing the product. This is analogous to en-
cryption because it prevents Mallory from tampering with the product.
– Various product identifiers, on the product, such as product name, manu-
facturer name, batch number, product number etc.
– Collectively the product identifiers should uniquely identify each product.
Analogous to a username.
– A secret known by the product manufacturer which is concealed inside the
tamper proof packaging, with the product. Both the product identifiers
and this secret are unique to this product. During manufacturing Bob
stores, in a computer database, the identifiers and secret of each product
he manufacturers. This secret is equivalent to a password.
– A list of instructions, a procedure for the customer to authenticate the
product. By, the customer, after opening the tamper proof packaging, com-
municating to the manufacturer, via website, text message or other, the
identifiers and the concealed secret, whereupon:
– The manufacturer will compare the customer’s product identifiers and
product secret to actual identifiers and secrets used by the manufacturer.
– Incorrect identifiers and secret indicate a counterfeit. Correct values may
indicate a genuine product.
– Correct Identifiers and secret: The manufacturer will authenticate the prod-
uct as genuine if the product has not previously been authenticated. Other-
wise the manufacturer should reply with details of the time and date of its
original authentication i.e. it’s a single use password. If this identifier-secret
pair has been used a number of times the manufacturer can communicate
this to Alice i.e. a large number of counterfeits with this identifier-secret
pair have been manufactured.
– If customs, or law enforcement, open a product and test its authenticity
they should put the product into a new tamper proof package with new
identifiers and a new secret. These should be authenticated through the
same website. This is to prevent counterfeiters from using this as a trick.
Alternatively pharmaceutical drug companies could include a second pair
of identifiers and authentication codes specifically for customs officers, and
law enforcement.
Next I will discuss a major flaw with this solution i.e. counterfeiters will
place their own website address on their counterfeit.
2.3 The ’Common Knowledge’ Website
You authenticate a digital signature by (a) using a public key to carry out a
one-way function. And (b) you compare the output of that function with what
you expected i.e. you ’authenticate the output’.
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Reference [4] actually compares a one-way function to breaking a plate1.
Opening the tamper proof packaging destroys the packaging i.e. it’s a one-way
function.
Like digital signatures, we authenticate the pharmaceutical product by
(a) carrying out a one-way function by breaking the tamper proof packaging.
And (b) we compare the concealed secret with the manufacturer’s secret via
a website, or other.
With digital signatures the public key is common knowledge i.e. readily
available from a reliable source. In the same way the domain name of the
authenticating website should be common knowledge.
That is, the entire pharmaceutical industry should use one website address.
Then they publicise that one address. Part of publicising that address includes
stating that any product which specifies a different website, for authentication,
is a counterfeit. If Mallory, counterfeiters, continue to specify their own au-
thentication website then their products will be clearly visible as counterfeit.
Basically Mallory, a counterfeiter, will be forced into using the correct website
address. When this happens Alice ends up seeking authentication for counter-
feit goods from Bob’s website. That authentication process will fail and Alice
will know that the product is fake.
3 Authenticating Currencies
Three principle changes will allow us to implement the same solution for cur-
rencies. First, currencies will be unreproducible physical objects (UPO), as
detailed below. Specifically the one-way function, equivalent to opening the
tamper proof packaging, becomes the method of manufacture of the currency.
Secondly, we need screening strategies to confirm the authenticity of the cur-
rency’s UPO. And thirdly, there is no need for the common knowledge website
because the central bank’s name is already common knowledge.
3.1 Unreproducible Physical Objects
Consider the objects shown in Fig. 3. Unreproducible physical objects (UPO)
are such that nobody can create two UPOs that are identical.
Consider a manufacturing production line. Sheets of glass are laminated
and cut into small square tiles. Finally each glass tile is struck with a hammer,
shattering the glass. No two tiles will have the same pattern of cracks in
the glass. Hence anyone can manufacture UPOs but nobody can counterfeit
a specific UPO. Not even the original manufacturer. They are the random
output of one-way functions. Unreproducible = Uncounterfeitable.
Each UPO created is actually unique. I can try to create two identical
shattered tiles but the pattern of cracks will be unique for each tile. This is
the whole point of these UPOs. I can manufacture them, but even I cannot
1 Humpty Dumpty?
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Fig. 3 Shown are (a) a piece of wood with a grain pattern, (b) a piece of shattered glass
and (c) a human fingerprint.
counterfeit an existing UPO. In the same way I can grow a tree but the grain
pattern, of any given piece of wood, will be unique. Hence (a) in Fig. 3. However
there is a problem.
Counterfeiters don’t have to 100% reproduce the product, they can ap-
proximate it. In reference [1] I found that approximation of solutions broke
more of my anti-counterfeiting solutions than 100% reproduction. The wood
grain pattern could be scanned into a computer, then printed onto a sticker
and attached to a rigid wood like base.
In theory we have made progress towards resolving counterfeiting. In prac-
tice the counterfeiters will ’up their game’ and we find ourselves looking for
screening strategies again i.e. we need uncounterfeitable wood, or other.2
If the counterfeiters ability to approximate a UPO can be resolved then
attaching a UPO to a product is equivalent to giving that product a unique
fingerprint. A unique identity. Or, in the case of currencies, the currency will
be a UPO itself.
3.2 Authenticating Currency UPOs
Non-destructive screening strategies are still needed to confirm the authentic-
ity of the currency. However their purpose is to confirm that the fingerprint
is genuine. If shattered glass is used, how do we know a printout of the break
pattern hasn’t been placed on a sheet of glass of the correct weight? Some
fingerprint scanners can be fooled with basic printouts of the correct finger-
print.3
Effectively our non-destructive screening strategies are directed at pre-
venting the UPO fingerprint from being counterfeited. We authenticate UPO
currencies by (a) subjecting the currency to non-destructive screening strate-
gies to ensure the fingerprint has not been counterfeited. And (b) we read the
fingerprint and serial numbers. Finally (c) we utilise a website/other to seek
confirmation that this fingerprint-serial number combination is authentic.
2 Arguable a ’counterfeit human’ is more commonly known as a ’human clone’. A natural
experiment in human cloning is identical twins. A quick search on the internet indicates
that identical twins possess the same DNA, yet have different fingerprints. See Fig. 3 (c).
3 Google ’mythbusters fingerprint hack’.
8 Joseph Kilcullen
3.3 Coins Example
Coins could be made out of glass. Flaws like tiny bubbles would be difficult
to position during manufacture. As such imperfections would make each coin
unique and impossible to replicate. Whatever process is used to draw a picture
and a coin value, could be used to add a unique serial number. Authentication
would involve authenticating the physical properties like refractive index and
examining the coin’s unique physical flaws i.e. fingerprint. Finally the central
bank, for that currency, can authenticate that ’serial number - fingerprint’
combination.
3.4 Paper Money Example
Here follows an outline of one possible UPO solution for paper money. The
thought experiments which led to this solution have been omitted.
– Some, or all, of the bank note should be a UPO i.e. some part of the note
should be possible to manufacture but impossible to precisely duplicate.
Like the shattered glass example.
– The UPO portion of the bank note should be amenable to one, or more,
non-destructive tests which will authenticate it. For example, does a screen-
ing strategy exist to ensure that an approximation has not been printed
onto the note, to look like the genuine UPO? That is, a good choice of UPO
cannot be printed without a test existing to ’reveal’ that it is a counterfeit,
an approximation.
– When measured the physical characteristics should generate a unique fin-
gerprint, a unique ’id’ of this unique bank note.
– Digital signatures are not practical. It’s more straight forward to print a
unique serial number onto each note and authenticate over the internet.4
– Metal incorporated into the bank note, similar to the metal strip, could be
used provided the magnetic properties could still be measured/tested.
All that remains is to identify an appropriate UPO. The following is sug-
gested as an example of what that UPO might look like. Other mechanisms
could also be developed.
– In the middle of paper money, like the metal strip, sprinkle a large number
of tiny pieces of metal over a specific area e.g. 1cm2. Or incorporate metal
into the tiny pieces of cotton that are used to create the paper money,
cotton money i.e. sprinkle tiny metal flecks over the entire bank note.
– Different metals with different magnetic properties should be used. Pre-
cious metals like gold or silver could be used but they would only be there
for their unique magnetic properties. Not as a commodity.
4 The discussion on printing digital signatures onto money has been omitted. Consider
A3 sized banknotes to facilitate printing a digital signature onto the note?
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– The random scattering of a random selection of metals should generate a
unique magnetic map. By unique I mean an extremely low probability that
two notes would have the same magnetic fingerprint.
– The idea is that magnetic properties should vary over the surface area.
According to the type and arrangement of metal flecks present.
– Any material or combination of materials which would help make the fin-
gerprint impossible to counterfeit could be used. Including metal flecks
with, difficult to discern, combinations of metals. Materials like Graphene
may also have a distinct effect on magnetic properties.
– The objective is to have several variables which will vary over the surface
of the UPO. They should be easy to measure and test to ensure they
have not been counterfeited. The precise combination should generate a
unique fingerprint. The density of metal flecks would be determined by
the ability to measure the magnetic response and capacity of the paper
to physically hold that many metal flecks in place. The area covered, the
types of metals used, the density of flecks and spread/location of those
metal flecks should, collectively, interfere with a magnetic field in a unique
manner i.e. a fingerprint. Some machine/device should be developed which
would interrogate the magnetic properties over the surface area of the
fingerprint.
– Some rock candy sweets are manufactured by making one massive sweet
with the text, or picture, constructed from large lumps of candy.5 Then
it is rolled into long bars. As it is rolled the text, or picture, shrinks. In
the same way long bars of metal could be combined to form one large bar
with the same arrangement of metals as a specific UPO. At that point
a wafer thin slice could be taken off and placed into a counterfeit bank
note. If the density of metal flecks in the genuine fingerprint allows gaps.
Then shining a bright light through the paper will reveal these gaps. A
scanned image, taken like this, could be incorporated into the fingerprint.
In this way the metal bar process similar to manufacturing candy will not
work. Incorporating metal flecks into entire bank notes will also solve this
problem.
– Tests other than measurement of magnetic properties could be used e.g.
what if magnetic ink was used to print a replica fingerprint. Shining light
through such notes may appear different to the original. Hence our finger-
print should be devised to be resilient to such counterfeiting attempts. A
backlit scan could be incorporated into the fingerprint i.e. the fingerprint,
itself, can be the output of tests to authenticate the physical fingerprint.
Authenticating the bank note consists of:
– First authenticate the UPO. By definition we should have chosen a UPO
which is amenable to having its authenticity tested. As described above.
5 Search on YouTube for ’How its made - hard candy’.
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– Once we’re satisfied that the UPO is genuine we measure, read, the finger-
print off of it. It’s possible that we already have the fingerprint from the
authentication of the UPO.
– Finally we utilise a website to communicate with the central bank that
issued the note. We transmit the serial number on the bank note and
the fingerprint measured from the note’s UPO. The website should then
respond, indicating the authenticity of any note with that combination of
serial number and fingerprint.
Some remaining points:
– The concept of the common knowledge website is not relevant here. It’s
obvious who issued the bank note. Also there is the possibility to limit
access to the authenticating website to banks and law enforcement, via
password.
– Even without authentication a UPO should help protect against counter-
feiting.
– Internet authentication could be restricted to large denomination bank
notes.
Effectively we are in an arms race. This solution simply forces the coun-
terfeiters to counterfeit the UPOs. While our definition of UPOs works we are
still in an arms race. The candy example is given to demonstrate how inge-
nious tactics will be employed to reproduce our UPO. The arms race has not
gone away. The tactics and ground rules have changed. Since every financial
transaction cannot have bank notes scanned and authenticated. Law enforce-
ment will still be involved in identifying counterfeits and tracking them back
to their origins.
4 Conclusion
Regular cryptography requires both encryption and decryption, as do digital
signatures. When working with manufactured goods one-way functions can be
used, like breaking tamper proof packaging. The fact that these acts cannot
be undone can be used to our advantage. The combination of tamper proof
packaging, a concealed secret and a common knowledge website, for authenti-
cation, is analogous to a digital signature. Our ability to communicate with the
legitimate manufacturer allows us to communicate the secret, from within the
product packaging, to seek confirmation that the product is genuine, analogous
to utilising a public key to authenticate a digital signature.
Where products cannot be damaged e.g. currencies, we must make the
product itself the output of a random one-way function. Anyone can manufac-
ture currencies of this kind, but only the original central bank will authenticate
its notes as genuine. This process is equivalent to the pharmaceutical drug ex-
ample except the currency is manufactured by the random output of a one-way
function. Provided the physical fingerprint cannot be counterfeited it can be
authenticated by the legitimate manufacturer, thus preventing counterfeiting.
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